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Decentralization and corporate investment: Evidence from China 
 
Abstract:Taking advantage of the decentralization reform that enlarges the authority of 
county governments in China, we construct a quasi-experiment. Using a large sample of 
Chinese firms, we show that after the decentralization reform, firms located in decentralized 
counties experienced a significant increase in investment expenditure compared with other 
firms. We also find thatafter the decentralization reform, SOEs experiencedgreater increase in 
investment expenditure on averagecompared with non-SOEs, and that, within non-SOEs, 
collective firms had an even larger increase in investments, followed by foreign firms and 
private firms. Further analysis shows that the influence of the decentralization reform was 
more significant in more developed markets, and that the increased investment was 
associated with improved productivity, which was more pronounced in SOEs. These results 
are robust to using alternative samples by excluding either non-decentralized counties or 
counties with other reforms. Overall, these findings support the view that the decentralization 
reform improves government efficiency and creates positive externalities,thereby 
encouraging firms to invest. 
 
1. Introduction 
Decentralization involves the devolution of authorities and responsibilities from the 
central government to local governments. Recent studies on decentralization and its economic 
implications present two conflicting views. The first argues that decentralization reduces 
government hierarchy, can improve government efficiency and promotes economic growth 
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(Xie et al., 1999; Akai and Sakata, 2002; Zhang, 2006; Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007). 
The second, however, contends that decentralization enlarges the autonomy of local 
governments, which could impede coordination and lead to government inefficiency 
(Treisman, 2000). 
Existing studies almost exclusively focus on developed markets, while the extent to 
which decentralization affects the real economy in emerging markets is still unclear. The 
effectiveness of decentralization is perhaps more important in emerging markets, where 
business is known to be heavily influenced by government intervention. Moreover, existing 
literature on the economic implications of decentralization mainly focuses on its effect on the 
macro-economy, such as regional economic growth and government quality (Treisman, 2002). 
Whether and how the micro-economy is influenced by decentralization is still a controversial 
issue, particularly as there is still no systematic empirical evidence as to whether and how the 
decentralization influences corporate investment decisions and, in turn, firm profitability. 
This issue is crucial in gaining an understanding of the influence of decentralization and the 
associated change of political environments because the political environment usually affects 
firms’ investment policies. Thus, whether the decentralization is important and how it affects 
firms’ investment policies are particularly relevant for emerging markets. 
To investigate this issue, this study investigates the largest emerging market in the world: 
China. More importantly, some provinces in China introduced devolution of political and 
fiscal responsibilities to local governments at the county level to various extents and did so at 
different times1. The timing of this decentralization was largely independent from the 
characteristics and economic growth opportunities of the local firms in the county. Thus, the 
introduction of the decentralization reforms led to an exogenous shock of government policy 
                                                          
1 The Chinese political system consists of five layers of government administration, namely state, province, 
prefecture, county and township. This wave of decentralization mainly involves devolution from the prefecture 
level to the county level and enlarges the responsibilities of the government at the county level.  
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for the firms headquartered in those counties. This enabledthe design of a quasi-natural 
experiment and the application of the difference-in-difference method for empirical analysis. 
This studyexplicitly examines whether decentralization affects the investment decisions 
of firms within the decentralized regions in China, which fit our theoretical analysis quite 
well. First, the Chinese economy is a hybrid of central planning and market-based activities 
in which the government controls the key resources essential to thecorporate sector. By 
directly controlling the activity of SOEs through government ownership and indirectly 
controlling the behaviour of non-SOEs through soft channels (such as regulation, license, and 
social and political networks),governmentscanexplicitly and implicitly shape the incentives 
and decisions of economic entities (Piotroski and Zhang, 2014). This heavygovernment 
intervention in business creates reasonable incentives for decentralization and provides an 
excellent environment for our theoretical analysis. Second, it is well documented that China 
possessesanunderdeveloped institutional environment. On the one hand,in the presence of a 
weak legal system, enlarged fiscal responsibilities for the local governments may 
triggercorruption. On the other hand, the career concerns of local politiciansmayencourage 
them to emphasize regional economic growth and creates positive externality (Li and Zhou, 
2005). As such, the relative costs and benefits of decentralization become less straightforward, 
and the examination of decentralization in China is able to advance our understanding of this 
issue in emerging markets.  
Using a large sample of firms from China, this study documents the following key 
findings. First, the decentralization reform in China encourages firms’ incentive to invest. 
Economically, firms’ average investment expenditure to fixed assets ratio increased by 1.929 
percentage points after the decentralization reform. Second, investment expenditure increased 
more in SOEs than in non-SOEs after the decentralization reform. Specifically, after the 
decentralization reform, the investment increased by 3.102 and1.292 percentage points in 
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SOEs and non-SOEs, respectively. Among non-SOEs, collective firms and private firms 
experienced an increase in investments by 4.727 and 2.490 percentage points. Finally, the 
decentralization reform improved firm productivity more in SOEs than that in non-SOEs, and 
among non-SOEs the productivity of collective firms also improved. The results show that 
increased investments due to the decentralization reform were associated with improved 
productivity in the SOE sector, relative to non-SOE sector. 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, extant studies on 
the influence of decentralization have typicallyfocused on its influence at the country level 
(such as economic growth and government quality), while our study provides evidence of its 
influence at the individual firm level, adding additional and useful evidence to the existing 
studies. We argue that decentralization encourages firms’ incentives for investments and in 
turn improves regional economic growth. Our evidence corroborates the findings of previous 
studies and in this sense we present a complementary perspective to existing studies.  
Our study also contributes evidenceregardingthe influence of government intervention on 
corporate investment policy. Existingstudiestypicallyhaveexamined government intervention 
from two perspectives, namely, state ownership and firm political connections, and have 
shown that government intervention substantially shapes firms’ investment policies (Chen et 
al., 2011; Firth et al., 2012). We complement these studies by considering the 
decentralization reform as an exogenous shock, and revealing a dynamic change of firms’ 
investment policy in the face of the easingof government intervention as a result of 
decentralization. Our evidence also presents useful implications for investigating corporate 
financing and other relevant policies.  
Additionally, in a departure from previous studies of cross-sectional comparisons 
thatsufferfromsevere endogeneity, our empirical design uses a quasi-natural experiment. This 
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is able to address the endogeneity issue to a large extent, thereby providing unbiased and 
consistent results. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the 
decentralization reform introduced by provincial governments and develops our hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the sample and methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results and 
discussions. Section 5 concludesour findings. 
2. Background of decentralization and hypothesis development 
2.1 The “counties power expansion” (CPE) decentralization and themotivation for it 
Since the economic reforms of 1978, China has established a political system consisting 
of five layers of state administration: the central, provinces, municipals, counties and 
townships levels, and this system is different from those applied in developed countries. This 
multi-layer administration system runs the risk that the authorities at the higher levels are less 
likely to collect sufficient information from thosebeneath them, reducing the efficiency of 
public goods and services provision and specific policy implementations. Thus, during the 
early stage of economic reform, the authorities at the municipal level played important 
coordinating rolesinlubricatingthis system and promoting regional economic growth.  
This system also has additional intrinsic disadvantages that further reduce efficiencies. 
First, under this system county-level authorities are at the forefront of, and take the 
responsibility for, promoting regional economic growth, even though they have limited 
discretion as political and fiscal powersarecontrolled by the municipal governments. This 
information asymmetry between the governments at the county and municipal levels 
discourages county governmentsfromproperly implementing policies or efficiently providing 
public goods and services. Second, municipal governments are not equally developed across 
regions, and the driving functions of some underdeveloped municipal governments are 
limited. Instead, these municipal governments are supported by governments at the lower 
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levels, resulting in the “small horse cart” (xiaoma la dache)phenomenon.This complicates the 
interactions between the various government levels and reduces their effectiveness in 
performing governmental duties. Third, career concerns may motivate politicians from 
municipal governments to behave dishonestly. In particular, they may expropriate resources 
from, or hold back resources allocated to, the county governmentsto concentrate on the 
development of their own jurisdictions. This may reinforce the conflicts of interest between 
these governments and reduce the effectivenessof governments at lower levels.  
The type of decentralization relevant to this study involves the devolution of 
decision-making and fiscal autonomy to county level from the municipal level and the 
reducing ofpoliticalhierarchiestocorrect prior inefficiency and further expand the authority of 
the county governments. In practice, the Chinese central government has implemented a 
series of reforms to achieve these goal sat the local government level. In particular,onAugust 
17, 2002, the government of Zhejiang province approved the ‘expansion of economic 
management authority in some counties,’ which urged the decentralization of authority to 
county governments2. These reforms included reducing the number of items requiring 
approval, shorteningtheprocedure for doing so, and shifting economic and management 
power to counties from cities. As a result, the administratively decentralized 
countiesnowpossessthe same power overfiscal settlement, capital allocation, project approval, 
public services and politician evaluationthatthemunicipalities in charge of them previously 
had.Since 2002, the central government initiated the decentralization reform in 17 pilot 
counties in Zhejiang province. Later on, in 2003, Guangdong, Henan and Hubei provinces 
also implemented the decentralization reform. By2007, 489counties had implemented the 
decentralization,accounting for 27.29% of all counties in China (see Table 1 for details)3.  
                                                          
2See the following link for details: http://www.110.com/fagui/law_250065.html.  
3We exclude counties of municipalities including Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing. 
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As a result of the implementation of decentralization at the county government level, the 
efficiency of government has been increased. Other anecdotal evidence also suggests that this 
is the case. Moreover, after decentralization, county governments had closer connections with 
provincial governments in the areas of tax returns and capital transferring, which reduced the 
severe information asymmetry between the different tiers of government. Additionally, Oates 
(1985) argued that local governments have informational advantages of local conditions and 
preferences, so that they are better off in designing investment decisions that are more 
appropriate and suitable for regional economic growth. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
2.2 Hypothesis development 
Administrative decentralization has direct and substantial effects on firms’ investment 
decisions in China through at least three channels. First, decentralization creates a positive 
externality and an efficient environment in which firms are encouraged to be involved in 
investment activities. Moreover, the devolution of economic and management powers from 
municipal to county governments awards more autonomy to county governments to support 
local economic growth, and inspires their ability and incentives to supportlocalfirms’ 
investment activities by designing specific policies. Second, career concerns might motivate 
officials in a decentralized county to behave honestly. As regional economic growth is a key 
measure of politicians’ performance (Li and Zhou, 2005), the hope of rising to higher office 
may causethese officials to cultivate a reputation for integrity (Myerson, 2006), and put 
further emphasis on attracting and supporting firms’ investment activities. Third, the 
decentralization reform removes the intermediary function of municipal governments 
between provincial and county governments. Thus, government subsidies and tax returns 
from the provincial governments are unlikely to be held back by the municipal governments, 
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which increase the internal funds at the firm level in decentralized counties. The increased 
available funds ensure the feasibility of firms’ investment activities.  
Based on existing theories, administrative decentralization reduces the layers of political 
hierarchy and government intervention, improves government efficiency, and thus has direct 
relevance for firm investment efficiency. According to the neoclassical view, government 
intervention is an important friction leading to higher agency costs, and existing theory 
predicts that investment efficiency decreases with the level of government intervention (Chen 
et al., 2011; Firth et al., 2012). As decentralization is seen as a means to reduce government 
intervention and associated agency costs, it is expected that decentralization leads to more 
efficient investments at the individual firm level. However, according to the Keynesian 
viewthatemphasizes the role of government, reduced government intervention will cause 
capital misallocation resulting in market failure. Thus, decentralization is associated with less 
efficient investments by economic units. These two theoretical predictions are the focus of 
our empirical work, and we form our hypothesis as follows: 
H1: After the decentralization reform, the investment expenditure of firms located in 
decentralized counties will increase more thanthat of firms located in other counties.  
Generally, based on the types of ultimate owners, firms operating in China can be 
initially divided into state owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs, while non-SOEs can be 
further divided into private firms, collective firms and foreign firms (Nee, 1992; Guariglia et 
al., 2011; Ding et al., 2013). In this section, we discuss the variation in investment activities 
after the decentralization reform across firms with different types of owners. The basic 
rationale is that some specific types of firms may be more influenced by the decentralization 
reform, or are more likely to engage in investment activities due to positive externalities. 
Existing studies have documented that Chinese corporate sector and banking system are 
significantly controlled by the governments. Governments shape the environments in which 
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firms operate, and SOEs are used by them toachieve both social and political objectives 
rather than value maximization. Due to the various multiple objectives placed by the 
governments, SOEs are more likely to be favoured or supported by government-owned banks 
in terms of financing, especially when they face financial distress (Cull and Xu, 2003; Firth et 
al., 2008). This soft budget constraint further mitigates SOEs’ concerns about insolvency 
problems and encourages them to invest more, including in suboptimal but politically 
favoured projects. Thus, after the decentralization reform, it is a natural expectation that 
politicians are likely to encourage SOE investments to promote regional economy relative to 
non-SOE investment activities, and we form our hypothesis as follows:  
H2: After the decentralization reform, the average investment expenditure will increase 
more for SOEs located in the decentralized counties compared totheaverage increasing for 
non-SOEs located indecentralized counties. 
Next, we discuss the variation in investment activities among different types of 
non-SOEs.In China, private firms account for the majority portion of the corporate sector and 
are considered as major engine of the local economy since the economic reforms.However, 
due to their short history on the markets and information asymmetry, these private firms have 
been long discriminated by government-owned banks (Firth et al., 2009), and thus face a lack 
of capital for investment (Xu et al., 2011).Although theiravailable internal funds increased 
due to greater government subsidies and tax returnsafter the decentralization reform, unlike 
SOEs who also invest in unprofitable but politicallyfavoured projects, private firms are likely 
to invest more efficiently to maximize their firm’s value. Thus, we conjecture that the 
increased investment by private firms after the decentralization reform is lower than that of 
SOEs. 
Collective firms emerged as a typical and hybrid form of ownership in China as a 
consequence of the ownership reform in the corporate sector. These firmsare independent and 
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legal economic organizations and their property belongs to the public.They are owned by 
collective investors representing communities in urban or rural areas and are managed by 
local governments (Guariglia et al., 2011; Ding et al., 2013)4. Thus, compared to private 
firms, collective firms are more closely connected with the government and have better 
access to external financing and investment projects that are still controlled and regulated by 
the government. We thus conjecture that after the decentralization reform, the increased 
investment expenditure of collective firms will be higher than that of private firms. However, 
whether the effect of the decentralizationreform on corporate investment is different between 
collective firms and SOEs is less straightforward. On the one hand, compared to 
SOEs,collective firms enjoy more autonomy, faceless political pressure from the 
governments, and set value maximization as their ultimate objective. Thus, it is plausible that 
collective firms have strong incentives to compete with SOEs for scarce resources, and to 
choose those profitable investment projects while leaving the unprofitable but politically 
favoured projects to SOEs. In this case, the influence of the decentralization reform on firms’ 
investment activities between SOEs and collective firms could be insignificant. On the other 
hand, an alternative explanation is also possible. Although collective firms are also supported 
by the local governments, these firms do not enjoy as many privileges as SOEs in terms of 
receiving key resources. After the decentralization reform, when more investment projects 
became available, it was expected that collective firms would have experiencedgreater 
increases in investment activities compared to SOEs. Thus, the question of whether the 
difference in increase in investment expenditure after the decentralization reform between 
collective firms and SOEs becomes an empirical one of particular interest.  
Foreign firmsare another major form of economic organization that hasemerged in China 
as a consequence of the Chinese government’s efforts to attract foreign investments. Foreign 
                                                          
4 Collective firms are different from SOEs in counties, as their founders are township and village enterprises.  
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firms have specialized knowledge and skills to analyse the markets and are able to recognize 
profitable investment projects. It is plausible that foreign firms increased their investment 
expenditure after the decentralization reform due to positive externalities and greater 
investment opportunities, or that they reducedtheir investment expenditure due to their 
uncertainty about the policy. Thus,the influence of the decentralization reform on corporate 
investmentis less clear for foreign firms, and the question of whether the influence of the 
decentralization reform on foreign firms is significantly different from the influence on other 
firms remains an empirical one. Based on this discussion, we form the following hypothesis: 
H3: After the decentralization reform, the increase in investment expenditure 
willbelarger for collective firms than for private firms, while SOEs will remainbetween the 
two. 
 
3. Sample and methodology 
3.1 Sample 
To conduct empirical analyses, we collect a sample of firms from the database filed by 
the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) between 1999 and 2007.This database includes all 
types of firms in China with annual sales of RMB5 million (equal to USD$775,000) or more, 
which mainly operate in the manufacturing and mining sectors and are located across 
31Chinese provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities. Initially, we are able to collect 
462,272 firm-year observations corresponding to 155,234 firms headquartered in counties. 
Following the common rules applied by most existing studies, we drop 6,410 observations 
with negative sales, 3,876 observations with negative equity and 4,622 observations with 
negative total assets minus total fixed assets. Our final sample includes 447,364 firm-year 
observations corresponding to 154,973firms. Thisis an unbalanced data set, with the number 
of observations ranging from a minimum of 34,252 in 2001 to a maximum of 82,364 in 
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2007.To eliminate the influence of outliers, we winsorize all of the continuous variables in 
our analyses at the 1% level. 
The NBS data contains information on the fraction of paid-in capital contributed by the 
state investor, legal entity investors, domestic individual investors, collective investors, 
investors from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, and foreign investors. Legal entities include 
both state legal entities and private legal entities. Based on the types of owners with the 
largest capital contribution, we firstclassify our sample firms into SOEs and non-SOEs.A 
firm is classifiedas an SOE if the state investor or the state legal entity investor makes the 
largest capital contribution. Similarly, we further classify non-SOEs into 3 groups of firms in 
which the largest capital iscontributedbycollective investors (Collective), private investors 
(this group include both domestic individual investors and private legal entities) (Private) and 
foreign investors (this group include investors from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and other 
countries) (Foreign). Our firm classification is consistent with existing studies (Guariglia et 
al., 2011; Ding et al., 2013). 
3.2 Methodology and estimation 
To empirically test how the decentralization reform affects firms’ investment activities, 
we develop the followingbaseline investment equation: 
(𝐼/𝐾)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2(𝐼/𝐾)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖𝑡(1) 
whereIit is firm fixed investment in the current year. Following Perotti and Vesnaver(2004), 
Firth et al. (2012) and Ding et al. (2013), we measure firm fixed investment as the change 
infixed assets (the difference between the book value of fixed assets of the current and 
previous year) plus the current year depreciation. We scale the firm fixed investment by fixed 
assets that are entered into equation (1). Reform is a dummy variable that represents the 
introductionof the decentralization. Its value equals 1 for post-reform observationsof firms 
located in counties that have implemented the CPE decentralization reform, and 0 otherwise. 
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Lagged investment is also included to control for any dynamic effect of the past investment 
policy. In the equation (1), irepresents firms and t represents years. 
To be consistent with the existing literature (e.g., Lang et al., 1996; Richardson, 2006), 
we also include several control variables in the equation (1), including Assets, Sale Growth, 
CF, Leverage and Age. Assets is a firm's size and Sale Growth is the growth rate of sales. We 
expect a positive coefficient for larger firms and firms with higher sales growth rate, which 
may have more resources for investment, resulting in positive coefficients for Assets and Sale 
Growth. A negative relation is also possible if smaller firms are in their expansion stages.CF 
is a firm’s cash flows. As larger cash flows provide a firm with more financial resources for 
investment, we expect a positive coefficient for CF. Leverageis calculated as the ratio of total 
debt to total assets which also affects firms’ investment behaviours. On the one hand, afirm 
with higher leverage pays more interest and is less likely to obtain additional debt financing, 
both of which constrain its ability to invest. On the other hand, higher leverage could indicate 
that firms are able to obtain more external finance, facing less financial constraints, and thus 
invest more. In this sense, we do not have any prediction about the effect of leverage on 
corporate investment which becomes an empirical question. We also control for a firm’s age 
(Age). The longer the firm has existed, the more likely it is to be in the mature or declining 
stage of the business life cycle, suggesting reduced investment activity and thus a negative 
coefficient for the variable. 
Our sample iscomprised of firms located in counties that have and have not implemented 
the CPE decentralization reform.This allows us to investigate the consequence of CPE reform 
using a differences-in-difference (DID) methodology that controls for industry, region and 
year fixed effects, which are representedbyIndustry, Region and Year in equation (1). The 
inclusion of these three fixed effectscontrols for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm 
level,whichremains constant over time, and any unobserved time-variant characteristics that 
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affect investment activities. Thus, our coefficient of interest is α1, which captures the DID 
effect. This method can remove any biases from comparisons that may result from (1) 
permanent differences between firms and (2) trends over time. In addition, as the 
decentralization reform happens at different times in different counties, our DID research 
design can also help us control for unobserved time-series changes in the economic 
environment commensurate with the CPEdecentralization reform, and more precisely 
distinguish the effects of the decentralization reform on corporate investment from other state 
level or industry level confounding factors. This method has also been discussed and applied 
by Lennox and Li (2012) and Liu et al. (2015). 
Our empirical design may suffer some potential endogeneity issues. First, control 
variables on the right hand side of the equationmay not be strictly exogenous, which 
introduces the endogeneity. Second, both firm investment and right-hand side variables could 
be simultaneously determined by unobservable firm-specific factors, which introduce the 
simultaneity. Third, firm investment policy could be determined by the investment policy in 
the past, which introduce the dynamic endogeneity. To address these endogeneity issues, we 
use the system generalized method of moments (GMM) for estimation, which can overcome 
the unobserved heteroscedasticity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity, and produce 
unbiased and consistentestimates (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Schultz et al., 2010).In our 
system GMM, we assume that all explanatory variables, except Reform, Age, and 
industry/region/year dummies, are potentially endogenous, and we used variables lagged 
three and four years as instruments for all the endogenous variables. 
To test our main hypothesis, we examine the experimental variable of Reform, and 
expect the coefficient of Reform to be significantly positive.We are also interested in 
investigating whether the influences of CPE reform on firms’ investment activities are 
different across firms that are of different owner types. When comparing SOEs and 
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non-SOEs, we include an interaction term Reform*SOEsin equation (1), where SOEs equals 
to 1 for SOEs and 0 for non-SOEs. To test our hypothesis, we expect the coefficient of 
Reform*SOEs to be significantly positive. When partitioning non-SOEs into three groups and 
comparing these types of non-SOEs, we choose SOEs as the control group and include 
threeinteraction terms Reform*Collective, Reform*Private and Reform*Foreign in equation 
(1), where Collective, Private and Foreignrepresent each type of non-SOE investors 
discussed before, respectively. According to our main hypothesis, we expect the coefficient 
of Reform*Collective to be significantly positive, while the coefficient of Reform*Private to 
be significantly negative, and we do not have any prediction about the sign of the coefficient 
of Reform*Foreign. The definitions of the variables used in our study are reported in Table 2. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Summary statistics 
As we use variables lagged three and four years as instruments for all the endogenous 
variables in the system GMM estimations, the number of observations included in the 
regressions reduces to 261,176, therefore, we report the summary statistics for this sample 
which consists of 261,176 observations.Table 3 presents the sample distribution by owner 
types. The results show that 29,208 firm-year observations are SOEs, 86,838 are collective 
firms, 98,006 are private firms, and 47,064 are foreign firms. Table 4reports the summary 
statistics of our main variables and Table 5 reports the mean and standard deviation for these 
main variablesby firm type. For the full sample in Table 4, we observe that the average 
investment expenditure to fixed assets ratio is 13.54%, which is close to that reported by 
Ding et al. (2013). Reform has a mean of 0.291, indicating that 29.1% of firm-year 
observations are from the decentralized counties. In Table 5, we find that SOEs have a 
lowermean investment to fixed assets ratiosthanother types of non-SOEs. These types of 
firms also differ in other variables, suggesting the need to control for these variables in 
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analyzing investment decisions. The SOEs also have a higher leverage, tend to be larger and 
have a longer history than the non-SOEs.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.2 The effectof decentralization on corporate investment: SOEs vs. non-SOEs 
Table 6 presents the test results of the effectof the decentralization reform on 
corporateinvestmentexpenditureby estimating equation (1). It is noted that as we use the 
system GMM for estimation and include lagged dependent variable as an independent 
variable, the sample size drops to 261,176 firm-year observations. Column 1 presents the 
baseline equation estimation in which we only include theReform dummy, and column 2 
presents the results in which we include SOEs dummy and Reform*SOEs interaction. From 
the results in column 1, we find that the Reform dummy, which is our primary variable of 
interest, has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level, indicating that 
the decentralization reform motivates firms to invest more. Economically, the estimated 
coefficient suggests thatthe investment expenditure to fixed assets ratio increased by 1.929 
percentage points after the decentralization reformfor firms located in decentralized counties 
compared to firms located in other counties. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that 
the decentralizationreform encourages firms’ incentives for investments through deregulation 
in investment licence and approval procedure.  
Furthermore, we examine the different effects of the decentralization reform on corporate 
investment between SOEs and non-SOEs, and report the results in column 2. Column 2 of 
Table 6 presents the test results of the effectof the interaction between the decentralization 
reform and SOEs on firms’investment expenditure, which predicts that the decentralization 
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reform incentivizes SOEs to invest more than non-SOEs. We find that the increase 
ofinvestment expenditure after the decentralization reformbecomes significantly higher for 
SOEs relative to non-SOEs, as reflected by the significantly positive coefficient on the 
interaction term of Reform*SOEs.Specifically, after controlling for other variables, the 
average investment expenditure to fixed assets ratiosignificantly increased by 3.102 
(=1.292+1.810) percentage points after the decentralization reform in the SOE sector. This 
result is consistent with the conventional wisdom that SOEs are usually the vehicle through 
which politicians intervene in the real economy in China, and recent anecdotal evidence that 
private investment is crowded out by SOE investment. Faced with incentives stemming from 
the decentralization reform, SOEs can acquire more key resources under government control, 
such as deregulation in investment activities,and thus are more encouraged to invest.Local 
governments also rely on SOEs to promote economic growth. 
Column 3 presents the test results of the effectof the decentralization reform on 
investmentexpenditure between different types of non-SOEs and SOEs.To test our hypothesis, 
we choose SOEs as the control group and includedummies representing each type of 
non-SOEs and their interactions with Reform dummy, and report the results in column 3 in 
Table 6. Based on the estimation results in Column (3), we find that the estimated 
coefficients of Reform*Collective and Reform*Private are 1.450 and -0.787, which are 
statistically significant at both 5% and 1% levels. These resultssuggest that compared to 
SOEs, collective firms experienced a higher increase in investment expenditure after the 
decentralization reform, while private firmsexperienced a lower increase in investment 
expenditure. Consistent with the results in the first two columns,the Reform dummy has a 
positively significant coefficient at the 1% level. Economically, after the decentralization 
reform, the investment expenditure to fixed assets ratio increased by 4.727 (=3.277+1.450) 
percentage points for collective firms, and by 2.490 (=3.277-0.787) percentage points for 
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private firms.These results are consistent with our main hypotheses and,in particular, the 
significantly higher increase in investment in collective firms also supports the view that such 
firms are likely to take advantage of the decentralization reformto compete with SOEs in 
terms of investment projects and to increase their investment activities. We also find that the 
decentralization reform does not affect foreign firms’ investment, which is also reasonable 
accordingto our arguments. On the one hand, foreign firms do not depend on local 
governments to acquire scarce resource, thus they may defer investments due to uncertainty 
about the decentralization policy. On the other hand, foreign firms are more professional at 
analysing investment projects and can more efficiently take advantage of positive 
externalities to increasetheir investments. Thus, the insignificant influence of reform is due to 
the net results of the above two opposite effects.  
In Table 6, we also report the p-values of the Hansen tests, AR (1) and AR (2). In 
particular, the p-values of Hansen tests are all larger than 0.1, indicating that we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis and the instruments we use are exogenous. Moreover, the p-values of AR 
(1) which are the test for the first order serial correlation of the differenced residuals are all 
less than 0.1, indicating that there is first-order serial correlation, and the p-values of AR (2) 
which are the test for the second order serial correlation of the differenced residuals are all 
larger than 0.1, indicating that there is no second-order serial correlation. These tests indicate 
the validity of our systemGMM method. Some of the results for the control variables are also 
consistent with our expectations. The significantly positive coefficients on CF, Sale Growth 
and Assetssimply show that larger cash flows from operating and financing activities lead to 
larger investments, and that larger firms spend more on investments as indicated by the 
significantly positive coefficient on Assets. Investment expenditure is negatively related to 
Age, suggesting that older firms invest less than younger firms. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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4.3Identification 
The credibility of using DID estimation is subject to the key assumption that CPE reform 
in a county, though not random, was uncorrelated with pre-existing differences incorporate 
investmenttrends across counties.There are no clear relations between corporate investment 
and determinants in selecting pilot counties to implement decentralization. Moreover, it is 
hard to believe that a province will select counties which tend to invest more than others to be 
free from monitor from local governments.As a result, even if differentiated trends between 
treated and control counties existed, the only plausible direction is to bias our results 
downwards, which will strengthen our conclusion.  
To assess the plausibility of this assumption formally, we borrow the method applied by 
La Ferrara et al. (2012), and exploit the exact timing of CPE reform to test whether the 
increase in investment occurs in correspondence with the introduction of CPE reform in a 
county. For this purpose, we estimate a flexible difference-in-differences model that allows 
coefficients tovary year by year. Specifically, we substitute the treatment dummyReformin 
equation (1) with a full set of dummies going from four years before to four years after the 
introduction of CPE reform. In particular, we estimate 
(𝐼/𝐾)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼−4𝐷−4 +⋯+ 𝛼0𝐷0 +⋯+ 𝛼4𝐷4 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡(2) 
WhereD0is a dummy for the year of CPE reform in a specific county; D-sis a dummy for 
s years before CPE reform; and D+sis a dummy fors years after CPE reform. The estimated 
coefficients of this set of newly entered dummy variables are plotted in Figure 1 together 
with 99 percent confidence interval. 
FromFigure1, we can find that the increase in corporate investment does not occur before 
CPE reform. Neither of the coefficients for the years preceding CPE reform, nor the 
coefficients for the year of CPE reform itself, are significantly different from zero. The 
positive effect of CPE reform on corporate investmentis realized one year after its 
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implementation, and persists at similar levels in subsequent years after the CPE reform. This 
result further validates our identification strategy and confirms the reliability of our main 
results.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
4.4 Robustness tests 
During our sample period, along with the decentralization reform, there are some 
counties that experience another reform to promote their independent positions. This is called 
“Annexation of suburban counties by municipals” reform (chexian she qu). Under this reform, 
some counties became the districts of municipalities that are in charge of them. The 
motivation for this is that as these counties are better developed then others, municipalities 
have incentives to incorporate these counties under their control to promote regional 
economic growth at the municipal level. To eliminate the potential contamination effects of 
this alternative reform, we repeat our previous regression estimation, this time focusing on 
the firms headquartered in counties that have only experienced the decentralization reform. 
The results are reported in Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
In our previous analysis, we use the DID analysis to derive the main findings. Although 
the DID approach could help us to control for unobserved time-series changes in the 
economic environment commensurate with the decentralization reform, a concern raised from 
this method is that the decentralization reform may have also caused significantvariations in 
the investment behavior of the control firms (those headquartered in non-decentralized 
counties). If this is the case, the observed significant DID effects could be partially 
attributable to the change in investment behavior of the control firms. Thus, to validate our 
main argument that the decentralization reform positively affects the investment expenditure 
of firms headquartered in decentralized counties, we repeat our regression analysis, this time 
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only focusing on the firms located in the decentralized counties. The results are reported in 
Table 8. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
The results in Tables 7 and 8 are very similar to our previous findings. The coefficients 
of Reform dummy remain positive and statistically significant in all models. Consistent with 
our previous findings, Reform*SOEs are positively and significantly associated with 
investment, suggesting that SOEs increased investment more than non-SOEs after the 
decentralization reform. The coefficient of the interaction term of Reform*Collective is 
positive and statistically significant, and the coefficient of the interaction term of 
Reform*Private is negative and statistically significant. Overall, our results are robust to 
alternative sample selection when dealing with alternative explanations.  
4.5 Additional evidence 
The basic rationale of our main findings is that the decentralization reform promotes 
firms’ investment activitiesto induce higher regional economic growth. The assumption on 
which this argument rests is that increased investmentis associated with high efficiency and 
higher productivity. To provide additional evidence regarding this assumption, we repeat our 
main regression estimations and replacethe dependent variable with firm productivity. In 
particular, we use the total factor productivity (TFP) as the proxy for firm productivity, which 
is estimated as the deviation between the observed output and predicted output using the 
Cobb-Douglas production function, following Olley and Pakes (1996)5. This measure has 
also been used by Brandt et al. (2012). The results are reported in Table 9. We find that the 
decentralization reform improves firm productivity more in SOEscompared with non-SOEs. 
Interestingly, in non-SOE groupswe find that the increase in firm productivity is higher for 
collective firms than that of SOEs, reflected by positive and significantcoefficients on 
                                                          
5Please refer to Olley and Pakes (1996) for detailed calculation of TFP. 
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interaction term of Reform*Collective in column 3. This is alsoconsistent with our 
expectations that collective firms increase investment more than SOEs which leads to higher 
productivity.What we argue here is that after the decentralization reform, local governments 
have more autonomy and can manage SOEs more efficiently, because they are closer to these 
SOEs and have more complete information about these SOEs and the environments in which 
these SOEs operate. In other words, the documented low efficiency of SOEs in previous 
studies could be due to the incomplete information possessed by the governments at the 
higher tiers. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
We next provide additional evidence about instances in which the influence of the 
decentralization is more significant to firms’ investment activities. We argue that as the 
decentralization is a typical policy implemented at the local government level, a more 
developed institutional environment and a more efficient government should ensure the 
effectiveness of implementing this policy. It is thus expected that our main findings hold for 
the sample of firms located in a more developed institutional environment. To provide 
empirical evidence, we collect the market development index filed by Fan et al. (2011) and 
divide all sample firms into two groups located in provinces with a market development 
index above and below the median level. We then repeat the previous regressions for each 
sample, and report the results in Table 10. Consistent with our expectation, we find that the 
effects of decentralization on firms’ investment expenditure and the variations in investment 
expenditure across firms with different owners hold in the sample of firms from more 
developed markets. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Our main findings suggest that the decentralization reform awards more power to local 
governments, which in turn encourage regional investment activities to promote local 
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economic growth. However, it could be also argued that in regions with overinvestment 
activities, the local government may have the incentives to reduce the investment activities 
after the decentralization reform to avoid the inefficiency resulted from overinvestment 
activities. We present the following argument and empirical analysis to rule out this 
possibility. First, under the current Chinese political personnel system, the regional GDP 
growth is used as the criteria to evaluate local politicians, thus politicians have strong 
incentives to promote regional GDP growth. Meanwhile, according to the report by the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, more than 90% of national GDP growth in 2009 is 
attributed to the investment activities6, thus we argue that politicians have stronger incentives 
to encourage regional investment activities which lead to higher GDP growth regardless of 
existing investment levels. Moreover, the recent reported overcapacity in China, especially 
after the economic stimulus package, also echoes the incentives of local politicians to 
encourage investment activities regardless of existing investment levels. Second, we conduct 
subsample estimation to address this issue empirically, by partitioning our sample based on 
the median value of investment levels for each year separately. Specifically, we aggregate the 
firm level data from the same counties and calculate the county-level fixed investment. Then, 
according to the median value of fixed investment at county-level in each year, we group the 
samples into overinvestment (equal to or above the median) and underinvestment(below the 
median) counties.We then re-estimate the main equation for each subsample and report the 
results in Table 11. From the results in Table 11, we find that the positive coefficients ofthe 
decentralizationreform hold in both sub-samples, suggesting that the effect of the 
decentralization reform on corporate investment is not influenced by the existing levels of 
investment across regions. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
                                                          
6Source: http://www.china.org.cn/business/2010-02/02/content_19356083.htm 
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5. Conclusion 
In this study, we examine the influence of the administrative decentralization on 
corporateinvestmentactivities using a large and representative sample of Chinese firms 
between 1999 and 2007. We use the reform of “county power expansion” to measure the 
decentralization, and we find that the decentralization reform has significantly increased 
firms’ investment expenditure. This is consistent with our hypothesis that the decentralization 
reduces political hierarchy, improves government efficiency andcreates positive externalities 
for firms’ investment activities. We also examine how this effect varies across firms with 
different types of owners. The empirical results show that the effect of the decentralization on 
firms’ investment activities is stronger for SOEs than for non-SOEs. This is consistent with 
the view that government influences markets and fuels economic growth through SOEs. 
Turning to non-SOEs, we also find that the influence of the decentralization reform is 
stronger for collective firms, compared with that in private firms and foreign firms.Further 
investigation reveals that the observed increased investmentexpenditure after the 
decentralization reformismore efficient for SOEs than non-SOEs, reflected by the higher total 
factor productivity. Our main results are robust to alternative sample construction and 
consideration of the endogeneity issue.  
From a dynamic perspective, our findings provide fresh and new evidence of how the 
decentralization reform affects the real economy by influencing the investment activities of 
the corporate sector. This effect is underexplored so far. Our findings have important 
implications for policymakers. Asthe decentralization reform is shown to be beneficial for 
corporate investment activities as well as the whole economy, policymakers should 
strengthen the implementation of this reform to restore and fuel economic growth, especially 
after the recent global financial crisis.Policymakers should also improve institutional 
environments and property protection to ensure the success of the decentralization reform. 
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Figure 1. Timing of Firm Investment Change around Year of “counties power expansion” (CPE) 
Reform 
Note: Estimated coefficients and 99 percent confidence interval from a regression of the firm 
investment on a set of dummies from t -4 to t +4, where t= 0 is the year of introduction of CPE 
reform. 
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Table 1. Summary of decentralized counties during our sample 
This table shows the number of counties that have adopted the “counties power expansion” (CPE) 
decentralization reform in each province from 1999 to 2007. 
Province/Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Hebei 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 22 22 
Shanxi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Inner Mongolia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Liaoning 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 
Jilin 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 33 33 
Heilongjiang 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 7 7 
Jiangsu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Zhejiang 0 0 0 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Anhui 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 12 
Fujian 0 0 0 0 58 58 58 58 58 
Jiangxi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Shandong 0 0 0 0 30 30 30 30 30 
Henan 0 0 0 0 0 35 35 35 36 
Hubei 0 0 0 0 17 17 29 39 39 
Hunan 0 0 0 0 0 0 88 88 88 
Guangdong 0 0 0 0 0 78 78 78 78 
Guangxi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hainan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sichuan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 
Guizhou 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Yunnan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tibet 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Shannxi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 
Gansu 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 13 13 
Qinghai 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ningxia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xinjiang 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 0 0 0 17 122 242 410 446 489 
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Table 2.Variable definitions 
This table showsthe definitions of the variables used in our study. 
Variable Description 
I/K The ratio of the difference between the book value of tangible fixed assets at 
the end of year t and the end of year t -1, plus the depreciation in year t, to 
thebook value of tangible fixed assets at the beginning of year t (which 
include land and buildings; fixtures and fittings; and plant and vehicles). 
TFP The total factor productivity, calculated following the method by Olley and 
Pakes (1996) 
Reform A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 forthe post-reform observations 
of firms located in counties that have implemented the decentralization 
reform, and 0 otherwise. 
Assets Logarithm of the sum of a firm’s fixed and current assets, where fixed assets 
include tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed assets, and other fixed assets; 
and current assets include inventories, accounts receivable, and other 
current assets. 
Leverage The ratio of total debt to total assets. 
Sales growth  Annual growth rate of sales in the current year. 
Age Logarithm of number of years the firm has been incorporated. 
CF The ratio of net income plus the depreciation to tangible fixed assets 
SOEs A dummy variable equal to 1 for SOEs and 0 for non-SOEs. 
Collective A dummy variable equal to 1 for collective firms, and 0 otherwise. 
Private A dummy variable equal to 1 for private firms, and 0 otherwise. 
Foreign A dummy variable equal to 1 for foreign firms, and 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Distribution of firms by ownership across our sample years 
This table shows the sample distributionfrom1999 to 2007 by owner types. 
Number of firms by ownership 
Year Total  SOEs Collective Private Foreign 
2000 26,049 6,189 12,817 3,428 3,615 
2001 23,960 5,263 10,885 3,869 3,943 
2002 24,003 4,204 10,159 5,357 4,283 
2003 27,972 3,786 10,657 8,746 4,783 
2004 26,680 2,861 8,662 9,967 5,190 
2005 31,308 2,520 9,266 13,344 6,178 
2006 47,004 2,421 11,649 23,933 9,001 
2007 54,200 1,964 12,743 29,422 10,071 
Total 261,176 29,208 86,838  98,066 47,064 
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Table 4. Summary statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics of the main variables in our study. I/K is corporate 
investment, which is measured as the ratio of the difference between the book value of tangible fixed 
assets at the end of year t and the end of year t -1, plus the depreciation in year t, to thebook value of 
tangible fixed assets at the beginning of year t. Reform is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
forthe post-reform observations of firms located in counties that have implemented the 
decentralization reform, and 0 otherwise.TFP is firm total factor productivity. Assetsis measured asthe 
sum of a firm’s fixed and current assets. Leverageis the ratio of total debt to total assets. Sales 
growthis measured as annual growth rate of sales in the current year. Age is the number of years the 
firm has been incorporated.CF is the ratio of net income plus the depreciation to tangible fixed assets. 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 25% 50% 75% Obs 
I/K (%) 13.54 16.88 -17.79 62.36 0.641 8.149 22.71 261,176 
Reform 0.291 0.454 0 1 0 0 1 261,176 
TFP 2.674  1.071  0.103  5.079  2.001  2.674  3.356  261,176 
Assets 
(thousands) 
52,121 99,160 885 652,505 8,000 17,530 45,915 261,176 
Leverage 0.556 0.241 0.0238 0.985 0.384 0.579 0.747 261,176 
Sales growth  0.119 0.407 -1.503 1.731 -0.0430 0.122 0.315 261,176 
Age 12.43 10.834 1 48 5 8 15 261,176 
CF 0.253 0.497 -0.238 3.250 0.0126 0.0869 0.273 261,176 
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Table 5. Summary statistics according to owner types 
This table reports the mean and standard deviation of the main variables in our study according to 
owner types. I/K is corporate investment, which is measured as the ratio of the difference between the 
book value of tangible fixed assets at the end of year t and the end of year t -1, plus the depreciation in 
year t, to the book value of tangible fixed assets at the beginning of year t. Reform is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 for the post-reform observations of firms located in counties that 
have implemented the decentralization reform, and 0 otherwise. Assets is measured as the sum of a 
firm’s fixed and current assets. Leverageis the ratio of total debt to total assets. Sales growthis 
measured as annual growth rate of sales in the current year. Age is the number of years the firm has 
been incorporated. CF is the ratio of net income plus the depreciation to tangible fixed assets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 SOE Collective Private Foreign 
 Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
I/K 8.360  13.858  13.245  16.713  15.479  17.782  13.248  16.226  
Reform 0.131  0.337  0.238  0.426  0.348  0.476  0.372  0.483  
TFP 2.412  1.329  2.745  1.097  2.654  0.986  2.732  0.995  
Assets 77719  127638 59068 111605 32119  68134  65091 101501  
Leverage 0.583  0.246  0.573  0.233  0.559  0.245  0.502  0.237  
Sale Growth 0.068  0.429  0.101  0.402  0.159  0.401  0.100  0.410  
Age 26.590  13.724  13.914  11.163  8.997  7.331  8.060  4.513  
CF 0.027  0.158  0.261  0.493  0.325  0.555  0.231  0.470  
Obs 29,208 86,838  98,066 47,064 
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Table 6.The effect of the decentralization reform on firm investment 
This table reports the results of the effectof decentralization reform on firm investment 
expenditure.The dependent variable is firm investment. Reform is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 for the post-reform observations of firms located in counties that have implemented the 
decentralization reform, and 0 otherwise. Assets is measured as logarithm of the sum of a firm’s fixed 
and current assets. Leverageis the ratio of total debt to total assets.Sales growthis measured as annual 
growth rate of sales in the current year. Age is the logarithm of number of years the firm has been 
incorporated. CF is the ratio of net income plus the depreciation totangible fixed assets. SOEs is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for SOEs and 0 for non-SOEs.Collectiveis a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
collective firms, and 0 otherwise. Private is a dummy variable equal to 1 for private firms, and 0 
otherwise. Foreign is a dummy variable equal to 1 for private firms, and 0 otherwise.Robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level are in brackets. *, ** and ***indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels. Hansen test are tests for the exogeneity of instruments.AR(1)and AR(2) are 
tests for the first and second order serial correlation of thedifferenced residuals. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Reform 1.929*** 1.292* 3.277*** 
 (0.405) (0.670) (1.028) 
L.I/K 0.008 -0.320 0.030*** 
 (0.006) (0.239) (0.007) 
SOEs  2.467*  
  (1.412)  
Reform*SOEs  1.810***  
  (0.611)  
Collective   0.234 
   (0.729) 
Reform*Collective   1.450** 
   (0.568) 
Private   2.483*** 
   (0.535) 
Reform*Private   -0.787*** 
   (0.304) 
Foreign   2.327** 
   (1.119) 
Reform*Foreign   0.207 
   (0.381) 
Assets 0.396 1.192** 0.756** 
 (0.289) (0.569) (0.369) 
Leverage 30.320*** 40.910** 35.020 
 (10.280) (19.240) (21.790) 
Sales Growth 22.650*** 34.460*** 2.944 
 (2.275) (10.420) (7.986) 
Age -0.793*** 0.006 -1.149*** 
 (0.252) (0.423) (0.301) 
CF 8.411* 29.170*** 8.389 
 (4.967) (10.100) (6.813) 
Constant -10.240* 0.00 0.00 
 (6.044) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry& Region&Year Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.20 0.61 0.63 
AR (1) (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR (2) (p-value) 0.15 0.23 0.14 
Obs. 261,176 261,176 261,176 
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Table 7. The effect of the decentralization reform on firm investment (excluding counties with 
alternative reforms) 
This table reports the results of the effectof decentralization reform on firm investment expenditure, 
excluding those counties that have implemented other reforms. The dependent variable is firm 
investment. Reform is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the post-reform observations of 
firms located in counties that have implemented the decentralization reform, and 0 otherwise. Assets 
is measured as logarithm of the sum of a firm’s fixed and current assets. Leverageis the ratio of total 
debt to total assets. Sales growthis measured as annual growth rate of sales in the current year. Age is 
the logarithm of number of years the firm has been incorporated. CF is the ratio of net income plus 
the depreciation totangible fixed assets. SOEs is a dummy variable equal to 1 for SOEs and 0 for 
non-SOEs.Collectiveis a dummy variable equal to 1 for collective firms, and 0 otherwise. Private is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for private firms, and 0 otherwise. Foreign is a dummy variable equal to 1 
for private firms, and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in brackets. *, 
** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.Hansen test are 
tests for the exogeneity of instruments.AR(1)and AR(2) are tests for the first and second order serial 
correlation of thedifferenced residuals. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Reform 1.848*** 1.248* 2.935*** 
 (0.416) (0.656) (0.922) 
L.I/K 0.008 -0.315 0.028*** 
 (0.006) (0.245) (0.007) 
SOEs  2.252  
  (1.381)  
Reform*SOEs  1.794***  
  (0.626)  
Collective   0.446 
   (0.669) 
Reform*Collective   1.330** 
   (0.532) 
Private   2.581*** 
   (0.516) 
Reform*Private   -0.781*** 
   (0.297) 
Foreign   2.028** 
   (1.022) 
Reform*Foreign   0.217 
   (0.373) 
Assets 0.395 1.181** 0.771** 
 (0.289) (0.562) (0.366) 
Leverage 26.990** 37.820** 28.470 
 (10.680) (18.960) (20.010) 
Sale Growth 23.360*** 35.340*** 5.749 
 (2.332) (10.780) (7.481) 
Age -0.786*** 0.001 -1.064*** 
 (0.253) (0.423) (0.284) 
CF 7.119 27.610*** 6.580 
 (4.920) (10.120) (6.283) 
Constant -8.163 0.000 -13.540 
 (6.148) (0.000) (10.850) 
Industry & Region&Year Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.23 0.58 0.39 
AR (1) (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR (2) (p-value) 0.11 0.25 0.11 
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Obs. 258,947 258,947 258,947 
Table 8. The effect of the decentralization reform on firm investment (excluding 
non-decentralized counties) 
This table reports the results of the effect of decentralization reform on firm investment expenditure, 
excluding those counties that have not implemented decentralization reform. The dependent variable 
is firm investment. Reform is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the post-reform 
observations of firms located in counties that have implemented the decentralization reform, and 0 
otherwise. Assets is measured as logarithm of the sum of a firm’s fixed and current assets. Leverageis 
the ratio of total debt to total assets. Sales growthis measured as annual growth rate of sales in the 
current year. Age is the logarithm of number of years the firm has been incorporated. CF is the ratio of 
net income plus the depreciation totangible fixed assets.SOEs is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
SOEs and 0 for non-SOEs.Collectiveis a dummy variable equal to 1 for collective firms, and 0 
otherwise. Private is a dummy variable equal to 1 for private firms, and 0 otherwise. Foreign is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for private firms, and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.Hansen test are tests for the exogeneity of instruments.AR(1)and AR(2) are tests for the 
first and second order serial correlation of the differenced residuals. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Reform 2.107*** 1.995*** 1.677*** 
 (0.295) (0.296) (0.426) 
L.I/K 0.016* 0.021*** 0.190 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.138) 
SOEs  -2.447*  
  (1.250)  
Reform*SOEs  0.653*  
  (0.390)  
Collective   0.844 
   (0.522) 
Reform*Collective   1.415** 
   (0.586) 
Private   2.799*** 
   (0.521) 
Reform*Private   -0.809* 
   (0.424) 
Foreign   -0.157 
   (1.591) 
Reform*Foreign   0.424 
   (0.585) 
Assets 1.120*** 1.316*** 0.789 
 (0.323) (0.354) (0.534) 
Leverage -15.970 -17.640 -2.246 
 (14.620) (14.03) (21.300) 
Sale Growth 19.840*** 16.280*** 7.933 
 (4.574) (3.807) (7.837) 
Age -0.652*** -0.857*** -0.690*** 
 (0.206) (0.208) (0.235) 
CF 1.438 2.006 -2.136 
 (4.147) (3.789) (5.087) 
Constant 0.000 7.427 0.000 
        (0.000) (5.882) (0.000) 
Industry & Region&Year Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.11 0.12 0.13 
AR (1) (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR (2) (p-value) 0.39 0.40 0.59 
Obs. 100,684 100,684 100,684 
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Table 9.The effect of the decentralization reform on firm TFP 
This table reports the results of the effectof decentralization reform on firm total factor productivity. 
The dependent variable is firm total factor productivity (TFP), followingOlley and Pakes (1996) 
andBrandt et al. (2012). Reform is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the post-reform 
observations of firms located in counties that have implemented the decentralization reform, and 0 
otherwise. Assets is measured as logarithm of the sum of a firm’s fixed and current assets. Leverageis 
the ratio of total debt to total assets. Sales growthis measured as annual growth rate of sales in the 
current year. Age is the logarithm of number of years the firm has been incorporated. CF is the ratio of 
net income plus the depreciation to tangible fixed assets. SOEs is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
SOEs and 0 for non-SOEs.Collectiveis a dummy variable equal to 1 for collective firms and 0 
otherwise. Private is a dummy variable equal to 1 for private firms, and 0 otherwise. Foreign is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for private firms, and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.Hansen test are tests for the exogeneity of instruments.AR(1)and AR(2) are tests for the 
first and second order serial correlation of the differenced residuals. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Reform 0.243*** -1.525* -2.475 
 (0.089) (0.868) (1.733) 
L.TFP 0.547*** 0.604*** 0.462*** 
 (0.075) (0.067) (0.044) 
SOEs  -1.493***  
  (0.429)  
Reform*SOEs  2.189**  
  (1.083)  
Collective   -1.868 
   (1.256) 
Reform*Collective   3.003* 
   (1.539) 
Private   1.226* 
   (0.659) 
Reform*Private   -0.304 
   (0.990) 
Foreign   4.473*** 
   (0.676) 
Reform*Foreign   -0.715 
   (1.368) 
Assets 0.038 -0.418 -0.057 
 (0.417) (0.421) (0.089) 
Leverage 6.139** 5.895** 0.802 
 (2.849) (2.540) (2.227) 
Sale Growth 2.069*** 2.240*** 0.210 
 (0.474) (0.386) (0.409) 
Age 0.058 0.390 0.185* 
 (0.343) (0.325) (0.097) 
CF -0.154 -0.586 -0.193 
 (0.872) (0.763) (0.559) 
Constant -2.315 0.000 2.191** 
 (4.330) (0.000) (0.872) 
Industry & Region&Year  Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.25 0.54 0.18 
AR (1) (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR (2) (p-value) 0.99 0.78 0.27 
Obs. 151,565 151,565 151,565 
37 
 
Table 10. The effect of the decentralization reform on firm investment under different 
institutional environments 
This table reports the results of the effect of decentralization reform on firm investment under 
institutional environments with different levels of development. Specifically, we divide our total 
sample into two subsamples with more and less developed institutional environments based on the 
median value of the marketization index filed by Fan et al. (2011). Dependent variable is firm 
investment. All the other variables are defined the same as those in previous tables.Robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level are in brackets.*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.Hansen test are tests for the exogeneity of instruments.AR(1)and 
AR(2) are tests for the first and second order serial correlation of thedifferenced residuals. 
 Good institutional environment  Bad institutional environment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reform 2.938*** 0.735* 1.652* -0.101 -0.545 -0.959 
 (1.216) (0.464) (1.032) (2.526) (0.591) (1.150) 
L.I/K 0.023*** 0.007 0.020*** -0.108 0.018 0.022 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.293) (0.011) (0.011) 
SOEs  -0.988**   -1.461**  
  (0.387)   (0.635)  
Reform*SOEs  0.985***   0.481  
  (0.369)   (1.115)  
Collective   0.613   3.862** 
   (0.565)   (1.672) 
Reform*Collective   0.975*   -2.078 
   (0.591)   (1.713) 
Private   3.016***   2.886** 
   (0.525)   (1.165) 
Reform*Private   -0.862***   -1.039 
   (0.312)   (0.840) 
Foreign   0.364   -0.411 
   (1.157)   (0.515) 
Reform*Foreign   0.370   -0.165 
   (0.343)   (1.231) 
Assets 0.929*** 1.132*** 1.115*** 2.552 0.262 0.690 
 (0.316) (0.395) (0.312) (1.909) (0.587) (0.783) 
Leverage 34.940 4.091* 2.487 -4.129 8.553 -8.925 
 (23.980) (2.102) (19.810) (30.980) (13.000) (15.360) 
Sale Growth 4.542 18.170** 11.980 0.269 9.543* 11.320 
 (8.293) (8.506) (7.415) (9.717) (5.202) (7.703) 
Age -1.425*** -0.675* -0.824*** -0.586 -1.202** -0.488 
 (0.351) (0.366) (0.268) (0.904) (0.507) (0.441) 
CF 12.540 10.580 3.772 11.460 -6.002 -10.020 
 (8.065) (6.848) (6.960) (14.190) (7.794) (9.276) 
Constant -17.810 -4.212 -2.179 0.901 0.000 0.000 
 (15.360) (7.010) (12.020) (21.720) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry & Region&Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.31 0.45 0.16 0.61 0.29 0.69 
AR (1) (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 
AR (2) (p-value) 0.16 0.10 0.63 0.62 0.75 0.96 
Obs 215,658 215,658 215,658 45,518 45,518 45,518 
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Table 11.The effect of the decentralization reform on firm investment according to county 
investment level 
This table reports the results of the effect of decentralization reform on firm investment according to 
county investment level. Specifically, we divide our total sample into two subsamples based on the 
median value of the county investment level. Dependent variable is firm investment. All the other 
variables are defined the same as those in previous tables.Robust standard errors clustered at the firm 
level are in brackets. *** indicates statistical significance 1% level. Hansen test are tests for the 
exogeneity of instruments.AR(1)and AR(2) are tests for the first and second order serial correlation of 
thedifferenced residuals. 
  High investment  Low investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reform 1.847*** 1.556** 1.100 1.444*** 1.826*** 1.755*** 
 (0.699) (0.717) (1.193) (0.401) (0.664) (0.655) 
L.I/K -0.162 -0.057 0.080 0.008 -0.095 0.009 
 (0.140) (0.272) (0.137) (0.008) (0.172) (0.152) 
SOEs  2.288   1.966  
  (1.587)   (1.560)  
Reform*SOEs  1.169**   0.931  
  (0.584)   (0.574)  
Collective   1.147   1.377 
   (1.277)   (0.954) 
Reform*Collective   2.340**   0.132 
   (1.128)   (0.653) 
Private   3.026***   2.552*** 
   (0.795)   (0.719) 
Reform*Private   -0.612   -0.535 
   (0.488)   (0.406) 
Foreign   -1.124   2.450** 
   (1.159)   (1.061) 
Reform*Foreign   -0.140   0.678 
   (0.729)   (0.592) 
Assets 0.842*** 0.498 1.300 0.129 0.263 0.384 
 (0.424) (0.492) (0.966) (0.403) (0.625) (0.517) 
Leverage 37.610* 42.950** -12.750 0.929 31.040 16.980 
 (19.300) (21.340) (19.310) (11.370) (21.330) (17.650) 
Sale Growth 24.890*** 28.470*** -3.775 25.010*** 25.220*** 25.430*** 
 (6.967) (10.980) (8.642) (3.757) (9.385) (8.235) 
Age -0.531* -0.071 -1.106 -1.398*** -1.006** -0.596 
 (0.319) (0.422) (0.642) (0.387) (0.481) (0.383) 
CF 18.790** 19.740** -3.771 -9.781 6.604 1.400 
 (8.594) (9.042) (15.040) (7.595) (9.698) (8.693) 
Constant -20.410* -23.900* 0.000 0.000 -9.774 -5.969 
 (12.250) (12.940) (0.000) (0.000) (11.850) (9.495) 
Industry&Region&Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.66 0.81 0.37 0.27 0.96 0.38 
AR (1) (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR (2) (p-value) 0.39 0.98 0.53 0.87 0.60 0.96 
Obs 250,235 250,235 250,235 191,313 191,313 191,313 
 
